Inclusive Education in German Schools. Who Can Learn Mathematics? Microexclusion in Inclusive Mathematics Education. Inclusions, Meetings and Landscapes. Brigitte Lutz-Westphal, Katharina Skutella. Landscapes of Investigation and Inclusive Actions. Back Matter Pages About this book Introduction The book provides an overview of state-of-the-art research from Brazil and Germany in the field of inclusive mathematics education. Originated from a research cooperation between two countries where inclusive education in mathematics has been a major challenge, this volume seeks to make recent research findings available to the international community of mathematics teachers and researchers.
In the book, the authors cover a wide variety of special needs that learners of mathematics may have in inclusive settings. Goldhagen's answer is simple: that excess brutality, he tells his readers, proves the intensity of German antisemitism. Germans tortured, humiliated, and degraded Jews before they killed them, he concludes, because Germans hated Jews and enjoyed making them suffer.
Reflecting on the last year of the war suggests another, more subtle interpretation of "excess cruelty. It might be hard to shoot pointblank a man of one's own age, a father of small children, like oneself, someone who eats the same food, lives in the same kind of house, speaks the same language. But if he has been forced to urinate on his own child, if he has been reduced to pleading desperately for his life, if his testicles have been cut off and put in a bucket with those of his friends and family, perhaps he seems like something less than a fellow human being. Once one has participated in such frenzies of torture and degradation, one has a stake in continuing the process.
To stop would be to confront crimes already committed; to continue is to find more and more evidence of the contemptibility of the enemy, to silence any stirrings of one's own conscience in orgies of violence. If hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue, then rationalization, denial, and even "excess brutality" are terrible tributes that genocidal perpetrators pay to that universal morality that gave Immanuel Kant such cause to marvel.
The final factor I would like to add to Mommsen's analysis is something we might call, for lack of a better word, opportunism. Not surprisingly, opportunism existed at every level in the Nazi system throughout the years of National Socialist rule. In the final stages of the war, however, fear, despair, and the drive for self-preservation transformed opportunism from the kind of arrogant search for material advantage typical of the days of German conquest to frantic efforts to stave off disaster in whatever ways possible.
On a small scale, there were individual deserters and Volksdeutsche who quietly undid their designations as "German" when it suited them to do so. In November , for example, the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle Ethnic German Liaison Office , the main SS office in charge of resettlement in the East, reported numerous deserters from the Waffen-SS in Hungary, many of whom had sold their uniforms and were going about in civilian clothes. Most, it seems, had joined the Waffen-SS as a result of the rather loose definition of "ethnic German" volksdeutsch.
In his memoirs the Baltic German Hans Eberhard von Cube describes the fate of a fellow ethnic German, a master carpenter named Schmidt. There he tried to pass himself off as a Pole but eventually failed. Opportunism also took form on a larger scale, such as when SD and Wehrmacht units supplied arms to Polish partisans to fight the Soviets and the Polish Communists.
Suddenly in the last year of the war Germans discovered they could recruit new allies - as long as they showed a degree of ideological flexibility, for example, in using Poles to fight against the Red Army. According to Curt von Gottberg, acting general commissar of Belorussia, at the end of January and the beginning of February , "three sizeable Polish detachments [Banden] came over to our side and initially also fought well. One can hardly claim to see here a return to pre ideals.
Fighting Communists, yes, but with the help of Polish nationalists? Using ammunition made by Hungarian Jewish women? Hoping for aid from the Japanese? The war may have provided enhanced spheres of activity, but it also forced new compromises on the Nazi faithful. In the final stages of the war, opportunism and desperation overshadowed any reversion to pre ideals. In general there must have been little in that would have been recognizable to loyal Nazis in , let alone Certainly Hitler and others had announced early on their intentions of expelling Jews from Germany, destroying the Polish state, and purging people deemed handicapped, but without the power that controlling the state, bureaucracy, and military brought, they could hardly have imagined what realizing those goals would mean.
War, as Mommsen admits, multiplied the devastating capabilities of particular ideas, including the Nazi ideals of the Kampfzeit. Here the phrase coined by Robert Gellately is instructive in ways far beyond its significance for understanding "war revolutionizes the revolution. The transformative force of war is even more obvious when one considers and the Nazi empire as a whole. In the Nazi movement showed its true face, but both its appearance and its essence differed from and even Murderous potential had hardened into deeds of annihilation. Contempt for human life had developed from a rhetorical mainstay to the central policy of a massive system of domination.
Years of unbridled power had made the impossible and inconceivable into reality. No doubt the vocabulary of the so-called Kampfzeit provided a useful rallying cry in the last year of the war and offered a concrete point of reference in a time of massive uncertainty. But was not , and no slogans from the old days of struggle, no matter how passionately invoked, could conceal the realities of bloodshed and ruin.
On relocation due to war damages, see BA Potsdam For the whole account, see fiches , pp. Rataje, Kr. Mai in der deutschen Erinnerung," WerkstattGeschichte 13 : Mai bis 9. Juli ," Stettin, Aug. Posen, Dolzig, May 10, , signed Walter, Oberst d. Posen, Dolzig, Sept.
Paths to Career and Success for Women in Science
Even prior to World War I, the academic elite in Germany felt that the international reputation of German universities and their academic degrees were being threatened by the growing number of foreign students in Germany. As a result, after the eligibility standards for the admission of foreigners to university studies were raised to such a degree that, during the s, the number of foreign students in Germany actually decreased despite the rapidly growing international demand. During this time the flow of international student migration was increasingly directed toward France and the United States.
In this paper I argue that the loss of international attractiveness of the German university was not simply a political result of World War I but that the German academic elite also contributed actively to this situation through restrictive admissions policies for foreign students. Universities in Germany were central to the social reproduction of the academic elite, and the devaluation of the German universities was believed to be the result primarily of the devaluation of "cultural capital" Pierre Bourdieu in the form of university certification.
The principle of social exclusivity within the German university system also was present in acceptance policies for foreign students, the price being increased isolation on the market of international demand for academic training. During the academic year foreign students in Germany were still a relatively small group, numbering around The number of students rose dramatically in the two decades preceding World War I, mostly as a result of ethnic discrimination and political persecution in Eastern Europe. During the period of inflation especially after the war, these numbers rose once again.
Pre-World War I figures show some 7, to 8, registered foreign students; after , there were over 15, This radical increase after the turn of the century presented a challenge for German universities in several respects. The international demand for university education, which was growing at an uncontrollable rate, had to be reconciled with the complex structure of the German educational system and its strict eligibility requirements for university-level studies. The university administration enacted a series of measures that - beyond even the political effects of World War I - were specifically responsible for Germany losing its place as the most important destination of international student migration.
By setting high admissions standards, the administration hoped to avoid the devaluation of the quality of German university studies if underqualified foreign students were admitted. Apart from the German language requirement, these standards were based entirely on the unique structure of the German system of education. The problem of determining international equivalents to German requirements, combined with the duration and difficulty of the admission process in Germany, caused German universities to lose their appeal for international students.
Bureaucratic restrictions made it impossible to establish an alternative admissions policy based on individual talent and ability. I examine these developments in three parts here. The first part deals with the increase in the number of international students at German universities since the early nineteenth century.
The second focuses on the increasingly restrictive standardization of eligibility requirements for foreign students wanting to study at German universities. Finally, the third deals with international alternatives to the German model. It is possible to trace the number of foreigners enrolled at universities in Germany as far back as the s, enabling the researcher to reconstruct these developments over a long period of time.
An analysis of the absolute figures shows that the highest rates of growth - aside from those of the inflationary period - were achieved in the last decade of the nineteenth century. See Figure 1. The largest increase in the number of foreign students was registered by the technical colleges, which around accepted about half of all foreign students and one-third in Another 1, foreign students enrolled at other institutions of higher learning after the turn of the century. During the inflationary period there was a short-term increase to 15,; in the total dropped back to the level of the pre-World War I era, between 7, and 8, From this point on - and not beginning after - this downward slide continued.
By the summer semester of , only 6, foreign students came to to study in Germany.
This decrease in the absolute figures seems minimal in relation to the percentage of foreign students among the total number of students in Germany. This percentage remained constant at between 4 percent and 6 percent in the period from to Between and it doubled to approximately 10 percent. Nearly the same level was reached again in Only seven years later, however, by the summer semester of , the percentage had fallen back to the pre average of a mere 5 percent. See Figure 2. These fluctuations can be explained primarily by the enormous expansion of the German university system after the late nineteenth century.
In the two decades preceding the total number of students doubled from 40, in to around 80, in Between the mids and the early s the total rose from 90, to about , On the one hand, this growth was the result of certain demographic changes; on the other, it reflected the availability of university-level education to a broader proportion of society. Around the turn of the century only 10 in 1, to year-olds were students. By the proportion had risen to See Figure 3. In only one percent of all foreign students enrolled at German universities were American four students. This figure fell to a mere 5 percent ca.
Carl Diehl attributes the decrease after to the fact that "most of the pioneers of the American university had been educated by then" and that "by that year several graduate schools had begun to compete with the German universities. In "it was estimated that a year of study in Germany was cheaper by a third than a year at Hopkins, Harvard, or Cornell, and this estimate included the cost of travel.
Beginning in the mids the frequency of Russian students studying in Germany surpassed that of the Americans. In the decade between and the number of Russians rose from to 1,, an increase of percent. By the summer semester of this number had again doubled, to 2, The foreign student total amounted to 7. Russian students were mostly concentrated in medical and technical subjects. Of the approximately 2, Russian students enrolled for the academic year of , more than half were studying medicine at larger German universities.
At the beginning of the century approximately 2, foreign students were enrolled at technical universities. Of this total, over were Russian 46 percent. In , of a total of 2, foreign students were Russian 24 percent. In addition, during the inflationary period following World War I, the largest group of newly registered students were from Eastern European countries. This total fell from 2, to in following years. An examination of the development of the worldwide total of foreign students shows an increase from approximately 20, to 70, between and Although these figures seem rather modest in comparison to those of the post-World War II era, the decisive changes in the international distribution of foreign students occurred before Most important, universities in France and the United States became more desirable destinations for students, whereas Germany's popularity fell.
See Figure 4. At the beginning of the twentieth century well over half of the 20, students studying abroad were found in German-speaking countries. Ten years later, just before the outbreak of World War I, the distribution was similar, with one-fourth of the 30, international students in Germany and another fourth in Switzerland and Austria. By , however, Germany had lost its position as the leading destination for international students. One-fourth of all international students now went to France to study, and 15 percent were being drawn to the United States.
Primarily students from the "most important countries of origin" i. The estimated 10, Chinese students studying abroad had passed over Germany "almost without a trace. Breaking down the total of international students according to region of origin demonstrates that the stream of European students - in contrast to the prewar period - was now directed toward France.
At 2,, the number of European students in the United States already was half that of European students studying in Germany. The most important destination for Asian students was the United States, due to the scholarship program set up in the context of reparations payments for the Boxer Rebellion. In approximately 4, - almost half of all Asian international students - studied in the United States, around 2, studied in France and England, respectively, and only studied in Germany.
The levels reached after the turn of the century were maintained - with minor fluctuations - through the s. The drastic reduction in the number of foreigners studying in Germany after from 10 percent to 5 percent was the result of the national expansion of the university system. If the number of foreign students in Germany is viewed in comparison to the global total of international students, German universities seem to have begun losing their importance by It is in this context that I will examine the criteria under which the eligibility of foreign students for university studies in Germany was determined.
Standardization of Prerequisites for University Study In order to address this issue properly, the particularities of the German educational system must be identified. Therefore, preparation for university studies began with the lower classes of the Gymnasium. In light of this fact, it is not surprising that the question of the equivalence of foreign forms of certification to the German Abitur remained largely "undefined and veritably without rule" until The mutual recognition of the Reifezeugnisse qualifying certificates of the Gymnasium by the states of the future German Empire was first achieved in the years and According to discussions held within the framework of German university conferences, the arbitrary and politically motivated decisions regarding eligibility and acceptance were at first directed against the growing number of Russian applicants.
This was later augmented by concern about the declining international reputation of German universities, particularly due to an influx of insufficiently qualified American applicants. After the s growing numbers of "Russians, mostly of Polish-Galician-Jewish origin" flowed into German universities. Restricted "for the most part to medical or technical studies in their own country by the Russian civil servant laws," they had been "forced to leave the country by the numerus clausus and the pogroms.
The issue of a numerus clausus for Russian students was discussed at the university conference of September The Foreign Ministry pointed out that such a regulation would be in violation of Article 1 of the German-Russian Trade Agreement of , which stipulated that citizens of each country would have equal status in the other. In order to avoid a violation, a numerus clausus of , "not to be exceeded by any nation" was created for all universities combined: "Because only Russia is in excess of the numerus clausus, the implementation of the rule will be restricted to Russian students and will take the following form: The individual universities will be instructed to allow no further enrollment as long as the numbers of Russian students are in excess of the quota of That German interests are involved is a result of the fact that American students have repeatedly come to Germany and, after a few semesters, completed a German doctoral degree without having the same previous education that would be required for a doctorate in America.
In this manner, the German doctorate has been highly discredited in America, and the destructive effects of this misuse can already be seen there. At the same time, the best students continuously shy away from coming to Germany for their doctoral examinations because they have found that they are not given sufficient credit toward their degree for their previous work at American universities. The result is "that the exceptionally high reputation previously enjoyed by German universities in America is steadily declining.
Perhaps they studied entirely in their homeland, perhaps they spent a few years in Paris or in Oxford, but it has already become dogma for them that the German doctoral degree is worthless, that academia in Germany has been lamed by pettiness and pedantry, and that the great academic stimulation stems from England and France, and most of all, from America. In the Prussian administration offered its assistance to the university conference in "developing a consistent rule for determining.
At the beginning of the twentieth century the "completely inconsistent and unchecked admission of annually increasing numbers of foreign students to the universities and technical institutes in the German Empire" served as the "impetus" toward efforts to "develop consistent guidelines for the admission of foreigners and surveying the eligibility requirements for foreign students in all the German states. With an ordinance from April 25, , even before the wave of foreign applicants during the inflationary period, the Prussian Ministry of Science, Art, and National Education nullified all previous eligibility requirements and centralized the authority to decide on all admissions applications.
The "fruit of thirteen years of research," 40 this study included a list of nations from Abyssinia to the United States in alphabetical order, with information concerning "the structure of the educational systems of each country and the evaluation of their certificates. The original goal of the study had been to compile of a sort of "registry of foreign certificates," including an "evaluation of every foreign institute whose graduates came to German universities.
This sort of register cannot be compiled at the present time. Particularly the countries of Eastern Europe, which send the greatest number of students to German universities, have no orderly school and university systems," making a general evaluation of transcripts seem impossible. Remme's study was attached to the circular for the decentralization of the decision on foreign enrollment applications "for confidential official use" 43 and was adopted by the other states of the German Empire.
In six points, he summarized their structural principles as the "minimum requirements for the acceptance of the certificate of foreign higher schooling":. Austria, Luxembourg, Sweden, and Switzerland are the only countries whose higher schools are of a type to be considered equivalent to those in Germany. Even in these countries, however, a complete nine-year course of study like the German system is not to be found. The certificates of foreign applicants were divided into four hierarchical groups. For this purpose, all types of certification were considered, not only graduation certificates.
Although in each case the institutions were evaluated individually, this evaluation ignored their unique characteristics, subordinating them to a universalized German pattern.
Christian Schwab, M.A., Mag.rer.publ.
This resulted in a hierarchy of institutions that were artificially integrated into the German system. Each institution's certification was then classified according to the German standards and assigned to one of four groups. Also assigned to this group were certificates that qualified the holder for university level studies "in the respective country, only after the fulfillment of further conditions" preparatory courses, etc. Into Group II fell such certificates requiring further preparation, as in Group I, in cases where the applicant had not completed the preparatory coursework required for German universities.
In such cases, the student was allowed to enroll for two years on a probationary basis; the work done in this time would generally not be applied toward a degree. Students in Group III were allowed restricted enrollment as "auditors"; "limited to the faculty of philosophy". This group included applicants from foreign vocational schools or with a middle- average level certificate.
No credit was given for previous coursework. Before students were allowed to enroll with regular student status in Germany they would have to pass an entrance examination. Students assigned to Group II also had the opportunity to take such an examination instead of going through the probationary period. Students assigned to Group IV had certificates that were considered to be equivalent to the German middle-level certificates. As in the case of applicants from Groups II and III, a short cut by way of the entrance examination was possible only in exceptional cases.
The form and duration of foreign study had already changed drastically by the time this system of evaluation came into effect. Most countries - "France, England, Spain, the United States, and South American countries" 48 - had university systems with a concrete curriculum and examinations for which there was no parallel in Germany.
This meant that it was hardly possible to integrate studies in Germany into the education of foreign students "without significantly increasing the length of their studies. By contrast, the organizational similarities of the systems in the other countries must have contributed to the development and stability of international student migration among them.
In spite of the growing international demand and the decreasing numbers of foreign students in Germany, the German university administrations responded with increasingly restrictive regulations for the eligibility of foreign applicants. In his report Die Studenten im internationalen Kulturleben Students in International Cultural Life from , Reinhold Schairer, a lawyer and head of the German Student Organization, interpreted patterns of student migration as the effect of the discrepancies in the development of university systems in different countries.
He distinguished between four groups of countries. The first group consisted of "the major cultural countries with fully developed university facilities, such as Germany, England, France, and the United States. The last two groups were composed of "areas whose systems of higher education had not yet been fully developed or were at the very beginning of their development, such as China, Korea, or Russia. According to Schairer's calculations, there were potentially 28, foreign students from countries with relatively undeveloped university systems.
Expectations that German universities could recruit a large segment of this group were made obsolete by the admissions policies of the universities and the Prussian university administration. With an emphasis on the higher standards set for foreign applicants after the war, 52 it was noted that "all" foreigners who registered to take the entrance examinations would "previously have been accepted for full enrollment and doctoral examinations.
A desire to study in Germany or even such certification as made an applicant eligible for university study in his or her own country was not enough. In contrast to the relatively open and unregulated eligibility and admissions practices of the prewar period, the examination served "not as a relief, but as an obstacle" to the admission process. Of almost 1, applicants, only 1, were admitted to take the examination. A mere of these passed.
With the consequence that "half of the applicants were rejected due to insufficient educational background," the introduction of the entrance examinations after the war led to "difficulties in diplomatic relations with representatives of the applicants' countries of origin. The ministry recommended the "entrance examination" as a method of "facilitating"!
A comparison of these comments to a statement from "university circles," published in the Vossische Zeitung in , illustrates the postwar injection of ideology into the initially pragmatic debate over the question of foreign student eligibility. The author of the statement pointed out that the type of educational background required for university studies had "completely different implications for foreigners than for Germans. In the case of foreign students, however, these interests became obsolete. It was not necessary "to guarantee that they are getting full benefit of the lectures.
The high admissions standards regarding educational background would only function as a protective measure" in order to reserve limited laboratory space for German students. However, in the liberal arts and the humanities, this argument could not be upheld: "I was not aware that foreign students could steal the words of the professor before they could reach the ears of the natives! Schairer's arguments in were much more farsighted than those made by the ministry in that same year. According to Schairer, the "strict principles" for the admission of foreigners appeared to be "involuntary in practice.
A more liberal and above all simpler and faster processing of applications. On the other hand, it was precisely these applicants who were "likely to be called to positions of great responsibility in their own country some day - life does not always follow school records. In light of the fact that other countries, motivated by reasons of foreign and cultural policy, had since the turn of the century begun to make their universities more open to foreign students, Schairer's considerations came too late. France and England had already "recognized the great influence which American students in Germany [in the nineteenth century] had on the intellectual development of their own country.
The numbers of Americans in attendance at European universities delivered the numerical proof for the impact of these measures. As early as , "purely academic doctoral and other university degrees" that were "primarily directed at foreign students" were introduced in France.
With the usual inscription at the state universities a strictly regimented course of study was initiated, the successful completion of which was rewarded by an official state degree. This state degree was also "a license for the practice of medicine, law, or to teach at state higher schools. The Americans, however, mostly recruited Chinese students.
Since that time, the scholarship recipients had brought "an even larger number of free students with them. An American report from the s - a follow-up study in modern terminology - documented the success of this strategy. Statistics compiling data from colleges for the academic year show 6, students, arranged according to subject of study and nationality. Of the 1, Chinese students in the United States, approximately one-third studied liberal arts and another third focused on either engineering or commerce. Of the 76 former students pursuing careers in business, 39 were Chinese.
The Soviet Union also was active in recruiting foreign students. This money was intended to enable them to travel to Moscow to study at the Sunyatsen University, newly established under the direction of Radek, at which Chinese students were presently enrolled in partial imitation of the American Boxer payment gesture.
In this context, a "strong propaganda" was developed "against Chinese students visiting American universities, and especially for the rejection of American scholarships, on the grounds that attendance at a Russian university was much more important and valuable. Aside from this emerging politicization of the recruitment of foreign students, the increasingly self-centered admissions policy for foreign students at German universities after the turn of the century made recruiting difficult among the growing numbers of foreign students.
During the nineteenth century eligibility regulations had been relatively open and undefined, focused on foreign equivalents to German certificates and favoring an individual evaluation of the educational background of foreign applicants. After these were replaced by standards based on comparisons to the unique structural principles of the German system of higher schools. As a result, these structures were artificially "universalized. According to a cross-referenced chart for the summer semester of , in which 5, university students from 29 European countries excluding the Soviet Union were divided into 34 areas of study, only 7 of the charted fields show more than students from the same country studying in the same subject.
With the exception of the medical subjects, which were in high demand, the distribution is random. These results were echoed in the distribution of 1, students from 33 non-European countries. It would have been more logical to place more emphasis on the aptitude of foreign students in a specific discipline as a criterion for admission and to pay less attention to the structural equivalency of the institutions from which applicants were coming.
This type of individualized admissions policy, with more importance given to the evaluation of applications by academicians, would have increased the objectivity of the process. In light of the alternatives, it seems in fact "questionable. The considerable growth in the number of foreign students at German universities during the prewar period was obviously not solely based on the good reputation of German universities.
Especially Eastern European students came to Germany to escape political persecution and ethnic discrimination. Regardless of their scientific qualifications, they were soon subjected to discrimination as "troublesome foreigners. In the international context, these unique standards were hardly compatible.
The origins of the subsequent marginalization of German universities on the international market of academic study can also be traced to the expansion of German universities in the Weimar Republic. In the course of the Weimar-era school and university reforms, the Germany university system was successively opened up to new social groups, including women. At the end of the s the German academic elite complained of the "overfilling" of universities.
The restrictive admissions policies for foreigners can be directly related to this issue. The governmental centralization of the admissions process provided an important indicator that, with regard to foreigners, politics were oriented on the interests of a German elite. Instead of entrusting the faculties and professors with the admissions of foreign students, these decisions were made at a central government level.
Rather than focusing on individual scientific aptitude, the criteria for the evaluation of foreign certificates were oriented strictly on their equivalency to the structural organization of the German educational system, and therefore on the logic of social selection and exclusion. Peter Drewek is a professor of educational history at the University of Mannheim. Please see issue no. Brzoska, ed. Berlin, , Reginald Wheeler, Henry H. King, and Alexander B. Davidson, eds. I confess that my thinking about the problem of academic "equivalencies" has been limited largely to my experience on admissions committees at several contemporary American universities.
As a historian of modern Germany, I had not given the matter much thought.
Peter Drewek's excellent essay has thus taught me a great deal, and it has persuaded me of the importance of this problem in shaping academic policy in Imperial and Weimar Germany. Drewek has imaginatively exploited the sources, particularly the protocols of the national university conferences Hochschulkonferenzen , to lay out a convincing case. Growing bureaucratic regulation of admissions standards, he tells us, had a crucial impact on enrollments of foreign students at Germany's universities. As these regulations became more restrictive, they undercut Germany's status as the Mecca for ambitious young scholars throughout the world.
Drewek has shown persuasively that this process set in shortly after the turn of the twentieth century and that it became more comprehensive and constraining in the later s, long before the National Socialists arrived to power. The flow of foreign students into German universities was increasingly limited in what he has called "the filter of bureaucratic rules.
My ignorance in these matters, from which Peter Drewek has now provided some relief, limits my qualifications to comment critically on his essay. I would thus prefer to pose a couple of questions, in the hope of provoking discussion of several broader issues - in areas where I feel intellectually more comfortable. I wish to address above all the question of what lies hidden or obscured in the numbers with which Drewek has supplied us. Does bureaucratic regulation provide a sufficient explanation for the fluctuations in the enrollment of foreign students at German universities?
At the very least, this explanation begs the question of who studied where and why. The "disaggregation" of some of the data might well reveal that issues of academic discipline, faculty strength, and even the presence of individual scholars in a university's faculty figured significantly in the decisions of foreign students to visit Germany for their higher education.
To cite some anecdotal evidence from a case with which I am familiar, the flow of foreign students to the university in Leipzig after was fed by students of history, particularly those from parts of northern and eastern Europe that had not been consolidated into nation-states. They were attracted to Leipzig above all by Karl Lamprecht, whose vision of "cultural history" appealed to them precisely because it assigned to "nations" an importance and dignity that were independent of statehood.
Second, how does one define "foreign? How many of the students from eastern Europe, including those whose citizenship was Russian, spoke German as their first language? Given the ethnic categories that increasingly governed discussions of citizenship after , this question is more than incidental to interpreting the statistics of foreign enrollments.
The whole story strikes me as intensely political. Several additional questions that I would like to see explored at more length pertain to this dimension of the paper. Where, for instance, is World War I? The graphs of student enrollment elide the war altogether, as they chart the period from to as a smooth line. They hide the fact that the war resulted in the departure of practically all foreign students from German soil - perhaps, one might think, with long-range consequences on enrollment fluctuations.
The fact that several of the major bureaucratic decisions that animate this story took place during the war also strikes me as worth pondering. One need not be a devotee of Foucault to appreciate the significance of these and the other bureaucratic decisions. They had to do with questions of categorizing, naming, and labeling people; and these questions, as Foucault has argued, were inseparable from issues of power. The central issue was to define those who were "qualified" for study at German universities.
Drewek's essay provides rich details about the elaborate schemes that were devised to fix the degrees of qualification, including one from the pen of Reinhold Schairer, who appears to have indebted himself to Herbert Spencer in defining the "differentiation" of school systems around the globe as the index of qualification.
On one front, then, Drewek's is the story of bureaucratic arrogation, particularly by the Prussian Ministry of Culture, of the critical power to define "qualification. At the same time, however, the success of the bureaucrats carried important ramifications for German foreign policy. The propositions that training foreigners at German universities served the interests of German power, that it translated into good will, cultural sympathy, and ultimately into political influence abroad, seemed to justify the compromises that faculties had regularly undertaken. What then of the broader political context in which these enrollment figures fluctuated?
I think Drewek's essay itself hints at some answers to this question. The question might be posed whether the retirement of Friedrich Althoff from the Prussian Ministry of Culture in did not put questions of university admissions into the hands of men of much less imagination or receptivity to the importance of having foreign students on German soil. Another dimension of the same problem has again to do with labeling. The tag "unqualified" correlated with a whole series of other labels, like "uncultured," "inferior," and "dangerous," through which many German leaders were increasingly making sense of domestic and foreign policy.
The deployment of social Darwinism in the construction of these categories of qualification was, in other words, hardly inadvertent or coincidental. The rigidification of these categories in the course of their bureaucratization might well have reflected a more general intensification of political anxieties in these leading circles. Foreign students at German universities thus posed a metaphor for broader concerns, and it was no coincidence that the growing salience of revolutionary Russians and eastern European Jews stood at the center of the debates over equivalencies.
The very language of these debates suggested as much. This topos echoed in variations all over the terrain of German politics after the turn of the twentieth century. In a series of stately tomes published between and , Nora solicited and reshaped essays by leading French scholars that, taken together, constitute an inventory of knowledge and conjecture about memory in the French historical context - memory as frozen in statues, in objects, in street names, in ceremonies, in political parties, in legends, in myths, even in historical works.
The success of this venture has been astonishing. The collection has sold over half a million copies in France alone. All of the essays have been translated into English, first in a three-volume edition published by Columbia University Press under the slightly odd title of Realms of Memory; all the other chapters will appear next year in a four-volume edition published by the University of Chicago Press. An exploration of German sites of memory is under way; the same is true in Italy and Portugal; 1 and everywhere in the Anglo-Saxon world, historians young and old have found in the subject of memory, defined in a host of ways, the central organizing concept of historical study, a position once occupied by the notions of race, class, and gender.
These themes have certainly not vanished, but they have been reconfigured and in certain respects overshadowed by the historical study of "memory," however defined. Clearly something important has happened in our discipline, something we need to attend to as more than a passing fashion. What are the origins of the memory boom? What are its implications?
Is Nora right in claiming that it is one of the cultural repercussions of the Holocaust? In this essay I hope to show that the subject of the Holocaust has indeed inspired a range of reflections on the notion of memory, trauma, and history. But there are other, distinctive sources of the contemporary obsession with memory that arise out of a multiplicity of social, cultural, medical, and economic trends and developments of an eclectic but intersecting nature.
My argument here is that each of these incitements to reflect on memory has its own inner logic and constituency but that the effect of their intersection is multiplicative rather than additive. In other words, the memory boom has taken off because the impulses behind it add up to a whole greater than the sum of its parts. One clear impulse to much reflection on memory has been public commemoration. Here marking or remembering the Holocaust is a critical problem, one mixed together in very troubling ways with other kinds of commemoration.
I shall later address the question as to whether any symbolic notation can accommodate the range of issues imbedded in the Holocaust. But on a more empirical, descriptive level, it is apparent that remembering the Holocaust has formed a significant part of a broader pattern of the commemoration of victims of twentieth-century war. The Holocaust, which took place between and , has never escaped from that contextual location. It is the commemorative moment that preceded it, addressing some of the complex issues of victimhood and bereavement during and after World War I. Taken together, these intersecting commemorations litter the calendar.
On the Israeli calendar, Yom Hashoah comes one week before Remembrance Day, a solemn recollection of Israeli soldiers who died in war from the period prior to the foundation of the state of Israel until today. Yom Hazicharon is followed immediately and with a wrenching change of pace and mood by Israeli Independence Day. The link between sacrifice and redemption is clear; more on that theme in a moment. On this day, redemption is linked not to the creation of the State of Israel but to the record of catastrophe over two millennia, a record recalled with sadness and longing for the day when the Messiah will arrive.
How redemptive is the notation of the other moments we recall on stated days of the year marking wars?
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In parts of Britain and Northern Ireland, the First of July, the anniversary of the Battle of the Somme, is marked collectively, as is dawn on April 25, the day Australian and New Zealand troops landed at Gallipoli; today that day is Australian independence day. Most are framed within a narrative of liberty being purchased through the shedding of blood. Here, as in Israeli Independence Day, the measure is the nation-state and its hard-won expression of a nation's collective life, so recently endangered by the threat of extermination.
And now we have January 27, the day Auschwitz was liberated by the Red Army. Here too commemoration cannot escape its political framework. State-sponsored commemoration is a politically sanctioned and politically funded rite of remembering in public, adjusted to a publicly or politically approved narrative. Remembering the Holocaust at this level is an extension of earlier twentieth-century commemorative forms.
It locates the narrative of war crimes and victimhood within the framework of national catastrophe and rebirth. The case of the new Holocaust memorial to be built near the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin shows the implications of this commemorative setting. The monument, a stone's throw from the renovated Reichstag and from Hitler's bunker, is unavoidably part of the story of Germany reborn. Some believe the monument is an essential and properly placed part of the story; others, and I am one of them, opposed the location of a commemorative monument to victims of the Holocaust within such a narrative.
Placing the monument in the heart of the national capital, geographically and metaphorically, also draws attention away from many original and sensitive commemorative forms in Berlin and elsewhere in Germany. Focusing on the national level of notation in my view wrongly configures the problem of how to remember the victims of the Holocaust. The alternative to a national monument is not nothing; indeed, the array of local, small-scale commemorative forms are entirely consistent with the federal, regionalized, richly complex nature of German cultural history, and helps show the multiplicity of meanings of remembrance, and indeed of history, lost in grand national narratives like that of Daniel J.
What is true of Germany is true of all other parts of Europe where memorials have been built. The national level of notation in no way occludes local memorials. None of these sites can "re-present" the Holocaust; nothing can do so in any conventional way. All they can accomplish - and it is a lot - is to suggest what is absent in European life because of the genocide and to leave the question of its "meaning" open. Daniel Liebeskind's design for the Jewish wing of the Berlin Historical Museum in Kreuzberg goes a long way toward describing this void.
But absence is not meaning. My own view is that it is unwise to try to encapsulate the Holocaust within any particular system of meaning. To paraphrase Primo Levi, a set of events about which one cannot pose the question of "why? This extended international conversation as to the appropriate character and content of Holocaust commemoration is bound to go on, and I do not expect to persuade everyone reading this essay of my point of view. But for our present purposes, what is most significant about this protracted debate is the way it has made us reflect on what kind of memories are elicited by other commemorative projects.
In whose interest are they framed? Most projects of commemoration have been created far from the center of political power. Second- and third-order elites have done the original work of remembrance, but frequently their work, originating within civil society, has been taken over by groups in power who feel they have the right and the need to tell us through commemoration how to remember the past. And the framework they tend to adopt is redemptive: Hope springs from tragedy; life moves on. Whatever you think of these issues, it is clear that the political debate over Holocaust commemoration describes one very salient element in the memory boom of the last thirty years.
Nora had a point. But the national political focus of this story is somewhat misleading. The state is not the sole nor even the primary source of the recent upsurge of interest in memory, whether or not related to the Holocaust. Once again, we have to address processes that arise from many different sources, some at the seat of power, some not. State agents, as much as those dedicated to a state in the making, have an evident interest in legitimating narratives; very often that is what they mean by "collective memory" - stories that polish the cultural credentials of their claim to power.
To be sure, all nationalist movements present versions of their own history and construct political myths that organize stories about the past to galvanize action in the present. There is little new in the recent forms of this kind of memory work. Consider Serbian inventions of a supposedly distinctive ethnic history, remote from or opposed to that of the Muslims and Roman Catholics, Bosnians, Kosovans, and Croats, with whom they lived and intermarried for generations; this is just one among many similar political conjuring tricks.
But memory work has focused on other collectives, too. In some places over the past thirty years, globalization and European integration have, to a degree, diminished the stridency of some national narratives. German and French nationalism - and their attendant rhetorical forms - are remote from those of the past. In other cases, nationalism is a direct response to the perceived dangers of globalization. Nationalist rhetoric has certainly not vanished, but it increasingly shares the stage with other languages of collective identity.
The much-heralded end of territoriality has not yet arrived, but state-bounded narratives increasingly compete with others of a regional or ethnic kind. On both sides of the Atlantic, in the developed "north" and the developing "south," many ethnic groups and disenfranchised minorities have demanded their own right to speak, to act, and to achieve liberation or self-determination. And those struggles almost always entail the construction of their own stories, their own usable past. Collective memory is a term that should never be collapsed into a set of stories formed by or about the state.
Here is a second source of the robust character of what I have called the "generation of memory. The museum is, in this sacred space, both a statement of universal truths and an expression of Jewish-American pride. Borrowing the notation of one literary scholar in an entirely different context, it expresses a measureless story in a grammar living on the hyphen, the hyphen of ethnic politics. The U. Holocaust Memorial Museum is a spectacular success in many ways, drawing a huge and varied population of visitors.
Its structure and organization constitute a great achievement, bringing to millions of people of all ages searing images of a crime without parallel. Handing out identity cards of Holocaust victims to visitors inscribes us from the outset in a family of bereavement, which among other things, is a Jewish family.